

The invention pertains to a process for securing a communication between a recognition device and an identification unit able to communicate with the recognition device in such a way that the recognition device can authenticate the identification unit so as to instruct the unlocking of openable panels of a vehicle and/or permit the starting of a vehicle.

Such a recognition device together with an identification unit constitutes a so-called «hands-free» access system. In such an access system, the recognition device transmits a signal consisting of data to a certain distance around the vehicle. When the user carrying the identification unit is located within the field of transmission of the signal, he transmits response data. If these response data are recognized by the recognition device, it instructs the unlocking of openable panels of the vehicle and/or permits the starting of the vehicle.

Thus, the user can unlock the openable panels of his vehicle without having to manipulate any key or remote control: the simple fact of carrying or wearing an identification unit, which may be a badge, allows him to see his vehicle be unlocked.

Figure 1 represents an example of an exchange of data between a recognition device and an identification unit. This exchange of data is generally referred to as a recognition protocol. It follows a predetermined sequence consisting for example of an authentication phase AUT and of an antipirating phase ANP. The authentication phase AUT comprises a step of initialization or wakeup step RE, a request step RQ, an anticollision step ANC, a selection step SE and possibly a response step RP. The antipirating phase comprises steps of transmitting transmission data P1 and of receiving response data P1R. The response step

RP may possibly be combined with the antipirating phase ANP.

In such a system, the two-way communication in the form
5 of an exchange of data between the recognition device
and the identification unit is generally aimed at
enabling the recognition device to authenticate the
identification unit, on the one hand by verifying its
signature and on the other hand by evaluating a
10 reaction time in the exchange of data.

The objective of evaluating a reaction time is to
detect pirating by repeater: if a first pirate,
furnished with a first transmitter/receiver relay,
15 located in proximity to the vehicle, is in touch with a
second pirate, furnished with a second
transmitter/receiver relay located in proximity to the
bearer of the identification unit, the two pirates are
able to trigger an exchange of data between the
20 recognition device and the identification unit,
unbeknown to the bearer of the identification unit.

This being so, the repeater thus constructed
necessarily increases the reaction time in the exchange
25 of data between a recognition device and the
identification unit. By evaluating a reaction time, a
recognition device can therefore detect pirating by
repeater, and thus not instruct the unlocking of the
openable panels of the vehicle. A recognition device of
30 this type is known in particular through the document
DE 198 02 526.

Figures 2a to 2d are graphical representations of an
exchange of data between a recognition device such as
35 that disclosed in the document DE 198 02 526 and an
identification unit in the presence of a pirate relay.

In particular, Figure 2a represents versus time the
data transmitted by the recognition device.

The expression «reference event R» refers to any event of the recognition protocol identifiable as a cue by a pirate relay.

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The recognition device transmits a transmission datum P1 to the identification unit after an initialization time T_0 defined with respect to the reference event R of the recognition protocol. After receipt of a response datum P1R, the recognition device transmits a transmission datum P2. The time interval T between the transmission of two successive transmission data P1 and P2 is fixed and is greater than the reaction time T_r between the transmission of the transmission datum P1 and the reception of a response datum P1R in such a way as to avoid an overlap between response P1R and transmission P2 data.

Figure 2b represents versus time the data P1, P2, P3 sent to the identification unit after an outward journey to the pirate relays. This figure depicts the outward journey time Δt_1 of the transmission data to the pirate relays.

Figure 2c represents the time evolution of the response data P1R, P2R, P3R returned by the identification unit to the recognition device after it has been processed. The lag T_1 corresponds to the time for processing the transmission datum P1 by the identification unit. This processing time T_1 is constant and is known by the recognition device.

Figure 2d represents the time evolution of the response data P1R, P2R, P3R picked up by the recognition device. The time Δt_2 represents the return journey time of the response data in the pirate relays. The time T_r represents the reaction time between the transmission of the transmission datum P1 and the reception of the response datum P1R.

To detect the presence of a pirate relay, the invention disclosed by the document DE 198 02 526 proposes that the reaction time T_r between the transmission of the transmission datum P1 and the reception of the response datum P1R be measured.

When a pirate relay is present in the exchange of data, the reaction time T_r is equal to the addition of the processing time of the identification unit T_1 and of the outward and return journey times Δt_1 , Δt_2 in each pirate relay. When this reaction time T_r is greater than a predetermined threshold, the recognition device does not permit the unlocking of the vehicle. Generally, the predetermined threshold is slightly greater than the processing time T_1 of the identification unit since the speed of movement of the data is negligible.

However, such a system does not afford a sufficient degree of security. Specifically, to avoid being detected, the pirate relay can during a first exchange of data measure the duration of the initialization time T_0 , of the time interval T , and possibly the amplitude and frequency characteristics of the data P1, P2, P3. Then during a second exchange of data, the pirate relay can send a datum P1 early, advanced by the time introduced by the journeys of the data in the pirate relays so as to compensate for the lag due to the journey in these relays.

Figures 3a to 3d are graphical representations of an exchange of data between a recognition device and an identification unit in the presence of a recorder pirate relay.

In particular, Figure 3a represents the time evolution of the transmission data P1, P2, P3 transmitted by the recognition device during a first exchange of data.

An exchange of data is defined as an interrogation of the identification unit by the dispatching of the recognition protocol by the recognition device.

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During the first exchange of data illustrated in Figure 3a, a recorder pirate relay captures the transmission data P1, P2, P3 and records the initialization time T0, the time interval T and also
10 possibly the amplitude and frequency characteristics of the data.

During a second exchange of data illustrated in Figure 3b, the pirate relay triggers the exchange of
15 the data corresponding to the phase of authentication AUT of the identification unit. When this phase has terminated and after a time interval Tp defined with respect to a reference event R, it dispatches a transmission datum P1e which it has
20 recorded during the first exchange of data. The time interval Tp corresponds to the time interval T0 previously recorded less the outward and return journey times $\Delta t_1 + \Delta t_2$ in the pirate relays.

25 Figure 3b represents the time evolution of the transmission data P1e, P2e, P3e dispatched by the recorder pirate relay during the second exchange of data.

30 The advancing of the antipirating phase ANP with respect to the authentication phase AUT is not detected by the identification unit since on the one hand the latter does not know the time interval T0 and since on the other hand unlike the identification code, the
35 pulse P1 is not modified with each exchange of data between the recognition device and the identification unit.

Figure 3 represents the time evolution of the response data P1eR, P2eR, P3eR returned by the identification unit after they have been processed. The lag T1 corresponds to the time taken to process the response datum P1e by the identification unit.

Figure 3d represents the time evolution of the response data P1eR received by the recognition device. The reaction time Tr is equal to the processing time T1 of the identification unit. Consequently, the presence of pirate relays can no longer be detected and the so-called «hands-free» system is no longer sufficiently secure.

The purpose of the invention is to provide a more reliable security process.

To this end, the subject of the invention is a process for securing a communication between a recognition device and an identification unit able to communicate with the recognition device by a data exchange determined by a recognition protocol, one of these items of data corresponding to a reference event, the process communicating in such a way that the recognition device can authenticate the identification unit so as to instruct the unlocking of openable panels of a vehicle and/or permit the starting of a vehicle and furthermore comprising:

- after an initialization time defined with respect to the reference event (R) of the recognition protocol, a step of transmission by the recognition device of at least two transmission data,
- a step of transmission by the identification unit of at least two response data in response to the transmission data,
- a step of measuring a reaction time between the transmission of a data item and the reception of a corresponding response data item by the

recognition device, and a step of verifying that the measured reaction time is less than a predetermined threshold

wherein the time interval between the transmission of
5 two successive transmission data and/or the initialization time are/is made to vary.

The invention will be better understood in the course of the detailed explanatory description which will
10 follow with reference to the figures in which:

- Figure 1 diagrammatically represents an exemplary recognition protocol,

- Figures 2a to 2d are graphical representations of an exchange of data between the recognition device
15 and the identification unit in the presence of a pirate relay,

- Figures 3a to 3d are graphical representations of an exchange of data between the recognition device and the identification unit in the presence of a
20 recorder pirate relay,

- Figure 4a represents the time evolution of the data transmitted by a recognition device according to a first embodiment of the present invention during a first exchange of data,

- Figure 4b represents the time evolution of the data transmitted by a recognition device according to a first embodiment of the present invention during a
25 second exchange of data,

- Figure 5 represents the time evolution of the data transmitted by a recognition device according to a
30 second embodiment of the present invention during an exchange of data,

- Figures 6a and 6b represent the time evolution of the data transmitted by a recognition device
35 according to a third embodiment of the present invention during an exchange of data.

The security process according to the present invention causes at least one of the characteristic parameters of

the transmission data P1, P2, P3 and/or of the response data P1R, P2R, P3R to vary in a random manner with each exchange of data and/or within one and the same exchange of data.

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The characteristic parameters of the transmission data P1, P2, P3 and/or of the response data P1R, P2R, P3R are the time interval between two successive data T, the initialization time T0, the frequency of the carrier, the width of the data when the data are transmitted in the form of pulses and the coding of the response data.

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Only those embodiments in which the time interval between two successive data T and the initialization time T0 vary have been described in the present description. However, the present invention is in no way limited to these embodiments.

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Furthermore, it is possible to vary several characteristic parameters with each exchange of data and/or within one and the same exchange of data.

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Moreover, these parameters may vary randomly or according to a predetermined sequence.

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According to a first embodiment of the present invention, the initialization time T0 varies with each exchange of data between the recognition device and the identification unit.

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Figures 4a and 4b represent the time evolution of the transmission data P1, P2, P3 dispatched by the identification unit during a first and a second exchange of data.

The initialization time T0 is defined by the time separating a reference event R of the recognition protocol and the dispatching of the first transmission

datum P1 of the antipirating phase ANP (Figure 3). The reference event R can be defined for example by the end of the wakeup step RE, of the selection step SE or of the response step RP.

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According to the present invention, the initialization time T0 varies in a random manner with each exchange of data, the pirate relay can no longer determine the moment at which the datum P1 is dispatched by the recognition device. Consequently, it cannot dispatch a previously recorded transmission datum P1e with an advance corresponding to the lag $\Delta t_1 + \Delta t_2$ introduced by the outward and return journey in the pirate relays.

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According to a second embodiment of the present invention, the time interval T between the transmission of two successive data P1 and P2 varies in a random manner within one and the same exchange of data and with each exchange of data. Figure 5 represents the time evolution of the transmission data P1, P2, P3 dispatched by the identification unit. The recognition device transmits a transmission datum P2 after a time interval T10 and a datum P3 after a time interval T20. The time intervals T10, T20, T30 are random and vary within a predetermined span but they are always greater than the reaction time between the transmission and the reception of a data item so as to avoid overlap between two successive data.

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Since the time interval T varies in a random manner within one and the same exchange of data and with each exchange of data, the pirate relay cannot dispatch a datum P1e recorded during a first exchange of data with an advance corresponding to the journey time through a pirate relay since it cannot determine the moment at which a transmission datum P2 will be transmitted.

As a variant, it is possible to vary both the initialization time T0 and the time interval T. The

initialization time T_0 and the time interval T are characteristic time parameters of the recognition device.

5 According to a third embodiment of the present invention, the time interval T varies with each exchange of data between the recognition device and the identifying unit. Figures 6a and 6b represent the time evolution of the transmission data P_1, P_2, P_3
10 dispatched by an identification unit. During a first exchange of data (Figure 6a), the recognition device dispatches transmission data P_1, P_2, P_3 , each one separated by a time interval T_{10} . Then, during a second exchange of data (Figure 6b), the time interval
15 separating two successive data P_1 and P_2 is different from the time interval T_{10} and is for example equal to the T_{20} . Thus, it is not possible for the pirate relay to determine in advance the moment at which a data item is transmitted by the recognition device.

20 Moreover, the recognition device can perform a series of measurements of reaction time between the transmission of several data P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4 and the reception of the corresponding data P_{1R}, P_{2R}, P_{3R} and
25 take into consideration only certain measurements. For example, for one hundred reaction times measured in one and the same exchange of data, it would be possible to ignore all but the ninety smallest reaction time bits, so as to discard the abnormal reaction times due to
30 communication glitches. More particularly, in this mode of calculation, one is given a predefined integer number of measured reaction times which will be taken into account. Specifically, the transmission of four data bits may give rise to only three reaction time
35 measurements.

As a variant and/or in combination with the above-described mode of taking bits into account, it is also possible to calculate the average of several reaction

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